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an aetiou to ~Pt asidP salt>;; of ,•ertilli·ate,c or a
and loan association to
its eontrol or tht• wn rkPt
!'or its securities and
! hen' :1 t l<·ss than face
value, failed to stat<> faets suffieirnt to ~upport a eonelusiuu
that the
wert• void. wiH·n· sw:h
wen• JllH!lJ[estly not themselves eontnwts of wai1·t'r and y,,jd as su,.h
within Building uud Loan :\ssm·iati,m
to h,; eontracts of wain·r, :lnd wli<•t·c·, if
lawful use of the as~o('iatiou's funds, st11·h us,•, uml•·r ~ 14.11/,
did not render the pnrehnses inv,did.
[2] !d.-Certificates-Rights of Purchasers. --1'tirthasl·rs of building and loan association certifieates did not have a contractual
right precluding the Legislainr·e l'rolll
;;ubsequent to the purchases, in tlw
f'il'Pet of a violation of
the Building and Loan Association Act
au as~oeiation, where
Const., art. XII, ~ 1, in effect at the date of the purchases,
provided that all present and future laws concerning corporations might be altered or rt'pealed.
[3a-3d] Id.-Actions-Pleading.--~}ut
of l'onn•·r building·
and loan association certificate holders fails to allege facts
entitling him to rescission of the
sa!Ps of their certificates to the association for less than face Yalue, where no
restoration or offer to restore the sale price was made, and
where, the face value not representing an undisputed amount
due the assignors, they are not entitled to retain such price
and still have the sales rescinded.
[4] Cancellation-Judgment-Relief Granted.-- Sine<' tlw ohjedi ~-,,
in equity is to place
in his former position,
the collectibility of a dPht or judgment has no
on the
amount recoverable.
[51 Building and Loan Associations-Actions-~Pleading. ,\ u a~
signee of former building and loan assoeiation certificate holders fails to state a eause of action for damages resulting from
the association's conduct in
its outstanding eertifi-

See 4 Cal.Jur. 644; 9 Am.Jur. 160.
McK. Dig. References:
:3, fi] Building and Loan Assoeiatious,
§ 12: [2, 6] Building 11nd Loan Associations, ~ 7; 141 CancPllation,
§ 85.
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Af•tion to set asidP sales of certificates of building and loan
association to association and for reinstatement of sellers as
r<~rtifieate holders, or for
,Judgment for defendants
on sustaiHing drnmrrer to complaint without leave to amend,
affirm eel.
1\l orse
Tnlley and liJrskine,

Erskine,
Erskine &
& 'rullPy; for Appellant.

Sullivan, Hoche, ,Johnson & Ji'arraher and James F'arraher
for Re;;pondents.
l:)JIENJC ,J .---The plaintiff sued as the assignee of 250 fornJer inwstlmmt lcrrtifieatP holders of Pacific States Savings
nnd [,oan Company to set aside the sales of their certificates
and for reinstatement as eertificate holders, or for damages.
The aetion is based on alleged illegal acts and fraud of the
defendant corporation. The Building and Loan Commissioner
of the state was joined as a defendant. A judgment was
entered m1 an order sustaining the defendants' demurrer to
pl11intiffs' amended enmplaint -without leave to amend. The
plaintiff appeal(~d.
This is tlw F<er•oll(l app<'ai in tlw ease. rrhe first appeal also
m;,; by thP plaintiff from a jndgmPnt entered on an order
:.>llNtai ning- the defendants' r1emnrrer to the original complnint without leave to amend. That judgment was reversed
on the ground that leave to amend should have been granted.
(King v. J1Iortinuw (Jan. 1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 153 [188 P.2d
fl02] .)

The amended complaint 1vas filed on April 27, 1948. That
pleac1ing and the f1ecisiom; in prior rases involving the affairs
of Pacific States Saviugs and J_,oan Company (herein also

the historical
action.
States Sav. & L.
to 1he
Co. Y. Hlsc, 2:5 Cal.2d 822 [155 P.2d 809, 138 A.IdL
Kinu
Stales Sav. deL. Co .. 26 Ca1.2d 33a [158 P.2d
as a bnilding and loan assoeiaof the association continued in
flnancial condition until 1
when dne to the world-sdde
Peonomi<·
its af1'airs became involved
the neecsto foreelosc 011 real property holdings and because of
excess rlemands for withdrawals by investors. On March 4,
1!la9, the Building and r,oan Commissioner took possession
of the assoeiation 's property, bu~incss and assets. [1] It is
alleged that beginning in 1931 to the date of the commis~ioner 's possession, the association through its agents engaged
in a eom·se of conduct designed to acquire outstanding investment eertifieates at Jess than their faee value; that it commeneed the sale of foreclosed properties to acquire funds for
that purpose; that there was a market for its investment
eertiflcati~S by reason of the fact that holders ·were offering
their certificates for sale and that they were being purehac;ed;
that the association had the power to and did within limits
eontrol tl1e bid prices for the investment certificates although
it eonld not fix prices so low that holders would not be induced
to a(~eept the priecs offpred; that the association was always
able to fix priees on the market at substantially less than the
faee amonni. 'l'he association purchased investment certifieates aggregatiug $26 . 500,000 face value for approximately
$17,500,000, representing a difference of approximately
$9,000,000 behreen the faee amount of the certificates and
the amount for which they were purchased. The plaintiff's
assignors in the present action represent and seek to recover
$690,646.78 of that difference. 'l.'he action was commenced on
October ] 8, 1D48. It will be assumed that the present complaint sufficiently iudieates that elaims for the amount sought
were theretofore (luly presented to t lw Building and Lnan
CommiRsioner and were rejected.
The original complaint \vas framed to recover the stated
difference on the theory that the alleged course of conduct
rendered the purchases by the association illegal and void.
In holding on the prior appeal that the plaintiff should have
been permitted to amend, the District Court of Appeal said:
"It must be coneeded that the complaint does not plead sufficient facts upon which the transactions eomplained of could
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137 C.2d 430; 233 P.2d 41

be held void.· After mentioning the former case of King v.
States 8av. (f; L.
26 Cal.2d 333) the court
continued : ''The case we have here is also founded upon
d1arg·es of frau<1. Unless the plaintiff can amend his comto show affirmatively wherein the contracts involved
WET(' void and not
Yoidable, we must assume that if the
(·nn recover at all it must be on the theory that the
transactions
of were voidable because of the
franduknt
which brought them about.
On this
become necessary for him to rescind
the trammetiom; and restore everything of value ·which he
or to plead facts showing that plaintiff's ashad
signors were entitled in any event to retain what they had
rrcciYcd,'' citing section 1691 of the Civil Code.
'rhe ailH'lHled complaint was an attempt to comply with
the dE'rlarccl requirements. The questions to be determined
are whether the complaint as amended contains allegations
of fact sufficient to support a conclusion that the transactions
\\'ere Yoid; and if not, whether the plaintiff has brought himself within the provisions of section 1691 of the Civil Code
by alleging restoration of or offer to restore benefits received,
or faets showing the right to retain them in any event. The
plaintiff has also added alleged causes for the alternative
relief in damages in the event he has failed in the other
respects. (See Bancroft v. lVoodwanl, 183 Cal. 99, 102 [l!JO
P. 44:5].)

The plai11tiff eontencls that the fads alleged in the amended
(·omplaint sho"· a violation of seetion 6.02 of the Building and
f1oan Assoeiation Aet as in effeet during the times involved
( Stats. 1931, p. 483; 193>l, pp. 309, 1098, 1101; 1935, p. 800;
1 Deering's Gen. IJa\Ys, ~i..et 986.) 'I' he section placed limitations
on inwstors' withdrmYals of fun(ls by defining matured withdrawal (']aims (see seetion 6.01 for requirements to file notie('
of intention to withdraw by certifieate holders), preferrer1
('IHims. Hnrl "frer money"; by stating when available funds
are free money, ·when an association is on notiee, or on a pro
rata basis and b;~' regulating when free money may be used
and for what purpos<'. It is elaimed that the alleged use of
assoc·iatiou fnnds was eontrary to that seetio11 and >vas also
prohibite(1 by seetiolls 9.01 and 9.02 which reg-ulated the innostments H]l(1 loans that the association might make.
S('etiou (i.O:! prohibited the assoeiation from making a eontract \Yaiving the provisions of the seetion and provided that
an:v such eontraet should be null and void. Seetion 14.0;)
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dedared the wilful
be punishable as a criminal offense. Section 14.07 stated that
as ''otherwise
in this
lation of any of the
any
note, trust
or other instrument.''
'l'he
argues that the
were yoid as contracts of wai.-er.
sought to be avoided >Yere themselves not
of the prodsions of section 6.02.
were
eertificates on an admitted open market.
\vaivcr are alleged. Thus the transactions
11eitlwr contracts of waiYer nor
to such contracts.
If the purchases on the market were
to the act
as unlawful use of association
it may be assumed that
they 'Sere violatious but, pursuant to section 14.07,
not thereby rendered inyalid. That expreRs
against irr\'alidity of the unlawful acts
the
tion of the general rule relied on by the plaintiff that when a
statute prohibits or attaches a penalty to the
of an
act, the aet is \'Oid.
Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262
[191 P. 141; Stevens v. Boyes llot Springs Co., 113 Cal.App.
479, 482-484 [298 P. 508], for statement of the general rnle.)
[2] The aet of 1931 was a eontinuation of
law
( § 14.08) with additions including
clauses ( 14.04).
'l'he plaintiff eontell(1s that sinee section 14.07 was an addition
in 1931 and therefore was not the lmv at the time the a"''"t;uv
became investors
so we shall assume), it should not apply.
He thereby invokes another general rule, namely, that the proYisions of the law in force at the time the eontraet was made
constitute a part of the contract. He argues that the addition of Reetion 14.07 in 1931 was a
material
which would unconRtitutionally affect
contraetual rights (U. S. Const., art. I, §
sary to consider ·what weight this argument
were directed to purehases of assignors' certifieates
prior to August 14, 1981, the effectiw elate of section 14.07.
?\one of the alleged transfE'rs \HiS rnade
to that date.
·when the assignors became investors section 1 of article
XII of the state Constitution provided that all laws concerning
corporations and all such future Ja·ws might be altered from
time to time or repealed. Thus it was not a contractual right
of inyestors that the Legif>lature could not make subsequent
ehange in the legal effect of a future violation of the aet

that the

if unlawful acts of such associaI t was for the
to

proper ease the investor should be
of reseission
Tt follows that
not
facts sufiicient to
eond nsion tl1at the transactions were void.
[3a] 'l'he next
is whether the plaintiff has sufiithl'
to the equitable remedy of rescission; or, in the alternatixe, th1; right to recover damages.
P ttrsmmt to section 1691 of the Civil Code the assignors'
was i'l l'l'scind
npon discovery of the alleged
frn nil and to restore or offer to restore everything of value
n•et•iYed under the contraet sought to be rescinrled. namely,
tlh~
for their certificates.
Bven if it he assumed that the alleged notices of rescission
\n•re suft1cient from a standpoint of intention and timeliness,
yet
ther<' ·was neitlwr a restoration of nor an offer
to restore the amounts reeeiyed on the sale of the eertifieates.
'l'ht• plaintiff contends that the assignors are entitlrd to retain
i11 any event the amonnts they recriver1 on the sales. This
~~ontention may be deemed correct only if under the alleged
alternative cause the measure of the damf!ges is the difference
hetvrE'en what the assignors received and the face amount of
tl1e certificates. Por if what the assignors received on the
sale of their eertifleates was part of an undisputed larger
elai m or (1rbt then
that measure would control at law,
alld in
would determine the right to retain the benefits
re<:cive1l. (Gilson Q. llf. Go. v.
47 Cal. 597; Westerfeld
1 Ifew York
Ins.
129 Cal. 68
P. 92, 61 P. 667];
J!fattcson v.
147 Cal. 739 [82 P. 436]; Taylor v.
lfoppe1·, 207 Cal. 102, 105
P. 9!JO]; ,~faclsrwe v. Pozzo,
~6 CaL2d
815 f161 P.2d 449] .)
'l'o snbstantiate his contention that there was an nndisputerl
daim then due in the face amount of the certificates sold,
the plaintiff looks only to the face amount of the certificates.
lfl" likens the face amount to an unpaid judgment for the
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snm nf mo!Jf'.\' and
that the
}l0Sf'ible J
of nw (lf;SOdation at tlw tJJllC thf' U•'>'H"''''V'
,.;old for Ius>< i han tlw amount "dur" doPs not affect the measure of the damages n~eoverable on aeeount of the
fraud.
[ 4] Sillce t lH•
in l'iluity is to place the reseinding
party in his former
the
of a debt or
judgment has no bearing on the amount recoycrable. (
bell v. Birch, 19 Cal.2d
ID0-798 [122 P.2d
; Bank
Ltwcrica Y.
D8 Cal.App.2d
;J05;J()(j [21H P.2d tll4].) [3b] Here it is true that the condition
of the assoeiation and the measure of the damages are unrelated, but it does not follow that the correct measure is the
one invoked. The fallacy in the plaintiff's argument is the
assumption that at the time of the sale of the certificates
there vYas an undisputed claim due in the face amount of the
certificates or in any amount. The situation might have been
vomparable to the eases relied on involving fraudulent settlement of existing judgments, if the assignors had matured
claims for withdrawal in the amounts of their certificates and
they vYere by fraud indueed to take less. Contrary to the
plaintiff's assumption hmYeYer the complaint fails to show
that there \Yas any matured claim or debt due to the assignors
from the association at the time they sold their certificates.
lu the final analysis neither the alleged cause for rescission nor that for damages may be premised on an assumption
that the certificates had an undisputed value in the face
amount. The pleading discloses the UlHJnestionable fact of
the existence of an open market for the inYestors' certificates;
that clue to association losses sustained by necessary real property foreclosures, and the insolYeney or threatened insolvency
of thr association becam;e of the widespread economic conditions whieh materially depressed values generally, the sale
value of the certificates offered in the open market was also
affected. The plaintiff's assignors sold in this adverse market.
'l'herefore the only measure of their damages is that provided
by seetion 3343 of the Civil Code, namely, the difference
between the priee at which they sold and any greater amount
which the market would have brought save for the alleged
fraudulent conduct of the association. No facts in this conHeetion are alleged or relied on.
It must follO\v that the plaintiff has not shown suf:fieient
facts to support a recovery on either of the alternatiYe grounds.
[5] ~\s to damages. the material facts by which the proper
measnrr may be applied are lacking. The onl)• mrasnre offere<l
J'(•('(J\'Pl',Y
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that if the assignors had not
alleged fraud to sell their certificates
had retained them, they >vould have been paid during
the full amount of their certificates; that therefore
were
in the amount of the difference between
fae0 amount and the amount paid, or $690,646.78. All
hat the plaintiff is
is what might have been, had reseission been
[3c] As to
the facts
do not disclose the assignors' right to retain the consideration reeeiYecl on the sale of their eertificates am! at the
same time be reinstate(l in the position of the investors who
retained their eertifieates pending liquiclation and eventually
participated in the inereased values of the assodation 's assets
following the second -world war. It 'vould be impossible now
to eomputr what the outcome would have been had liquidation
proceeded with the assignors in the position of continuing
<·eriifieatr holders pursuant to an accomplished rescission. It
\Ymlld also be highly inequitable at this stage of the proceedings, nearly 20 years after the alleged activities, for the court
to make unprecedented exceptions to the rules applicable in
resrission by permitting the assignors to share in property and
assets in the preservation of which they declined to continue
their ~;npport by failing to comply with equitable requirements
at the time of their attempted rescission. The court may not
ihns secure for tl1em a continuing choice to be out or in, depending on whether the fortunes of economics took a tnrn for
\\·orse or better. To do RO would be in effeet to treat the
all egrd salrs as void rather than voidable, a result express I.'·
prohibitN1 by the statute.
[6] Nor is there gTonnd for extending relief on the basi8
that a fiduciary rrlationflhip existed between the association
and the certificate holders. There is nothing in the investment contract, in the statute, or in the facts alleged indicating
the ereation of that relationship. No ease so holding is cited
<1ml the treatment in pertinent cases is a recognition that the
rrlation is that of debtor and creditor. (See In re Pacific
(' oast Bldg.-Loan Assn., ] 5 Cal.2d 134 [99 P .2d 251] ; Bnrean
\Yelfare, etc. Assn. v. Drapeau, 21 Cal.App.2d 138, 146
f 68 P.2d 9981 : Zottarelli v. Pacific States Sav. & L. Co. 94
Cal.App.2d 480. 502 [211 P.2d 23] .) The duties and obligatimls of the association are set forth in the statute; the
statute provides what penalties shall follow from violations
therrof, and prohibits resulting contracts to be treated as
Yoid.

his a~;Hid:JlHJI
The
which were held
cient statement of a triable cause.
the conclusion that such
is affirmed.
Gibson, 0.
Spence, J concurred.

and

OAH'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
I am of the opinion that plaintiff's amended
stated a cause of action for fraud and that the demurrer
thereto should not have been sustained.
As I pointed out in my dissent in King v. Pacific States
Sav. & L. Co., 26 Oal.2d 333 [158 P.2d 561], the evidence
produced in that case was more than sufficient to show fraudulent conduct on the part of Pacific States in buying the certificates held by various investors for less than their face valne.
I also pointed out that the trial court in the case of Pacific
States Sav. & L. Co. v. llise 25 Oa1.2d 822 [155 P.2d 809, 158
A.L.R.
the
of the seizure of Pacific
States by the Building & I.oan Commissioner was challenged)
had found that misrepresentation and coercion had been resorted to by Pacific States in the acquisition of its outstanding
shares. This
in the Hisc case, did not disapprove those
findings but on the contrary found it not necessary to determine the sufficiency of the evidence on which
were based.
These three cases have their bases on the same set of facts.
In the second case, K1"ng v. Pacific States Sav. a; L.
the
majority held that there >vas no evidence of
either
actual or
to
charge. The majority here, in the tbird case, holds that
has .stated no
cause of
nor can he do so. And
the facts are the
same. As I read the majority
it appears to be conceded that plaintiff would have stated a cause of action had
he or his assignors taken the necessary
to effect a rescission-namely, an offer to restore the consideration which had

to retain that amount.
to the certificates

that form is more
of the District Court of Appeal
and I
ac!opt that porwll iel1 refers to Connts 8 and 4:
counts are based on
of fraud and
difference between the third and fourth
that a fiduciary re1ationsbip existed
his
and Pacific States. Plaintiff incorreference in both counts the proof of claim which,
to
he filed with the commissioner. This states
that 'the facts in support of Claimant's demands are set forth
the
and exhibits introduced in the case of
"\Yeslc!f King v. Pacific States
& Loan Company,"
~o. 271.000, in the Superior Conrt of the State of California,
in and for the
and County of San Francisco, and in its
States
and Lorm Company v. Evans,
Court, to which testimony and
is hereby made ns thongh set
forth at length and made a part of this dt>mand;
'' Ddendants elaim that plaintiff has not allege.d a trne
lweam;e tb rre was IJO notice of resr.ission and no
utfcr to restore.
' 'N o•rrcE OF RESCISSION
'' TllC only allegation concerning any notice of resCISSIOn
is llw follmrin g: · Ou or about February 3rd. 1938, plaintiff
gave Pacifie States written notice as follows: that the last
HH'ntioned
had assigned to him their claims to reenver from it said balances of their deposits shown on said
Exhibit "C"; that plaintiff was demanding payment of the
la;;;t mcntioneu claims from Pacific States; and that it Pacific
Statt·s did not pay the last mentioned claims, plnintiff would
<'OlllllleiWe suit to
their payment.'
'' 'fhis
as to other lists of assignors.
As said in McNeese v.
190 Cal. 402, 405 1213 P. 36] :
'f t is not necessary that the notice to rescind shall be formal
nnd
; it is suffieient that notice shall be given to the
which elearly shows the intention of the person
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to considrr the contract at an end. It ha;.; been
of an action is a
hrld in other states that the mere
suffieient disaffirmance of a sale.'
''Applying this test, it is obvious that the notice given
dearly shows the intention of plaintiff to consider the conthe sale of the certificates for the
trac:t. that
at an end. The notice was sufficient unless
to ofl'er to restore the
"\VAS 0PFEH TO RES'I'OHE NECESSARY?

''This depends upon what the true measure of damages was
at the time of the sale, for if plaintiff was entitled in any
event to retain the purchase price, no offer to restore was necessary. 'It is settled by our decisions that one attempting to
rescind a transaction on the ground of fraud is not required
to restore that which, in any event, he would be entitled to
retain. (See 1vlatteson v. lY agoner, 147 CaL 739, 743 [82
P. 436], and cases there cited.) This is upon the theory that
the defpndant could not possibly have been injuriously affected
by the failure to restore, and the plaintiff might be, for he
might not be able to again collect the amount from the defendant, if it should be so restored to the defendant.' ( Calz:fornia etc. Co. Y. 8ch'iappa-Pietra, Hi1 Cal. 732, 740 [91 P.
593].)
'' Defenrlants contend that the measure was that set forth
in section :3343 of tlw Civil Code, namely, the difference between the a(~tual value of the certificates and the amount paid.
Plaintiff contends that it is the measure set forth in Campbell
Y. Birch, 19 Cal.2d 778 [122 P.2d 902], and Bank of America
v. Orcenbach, 98 Ca1.App.2d 220 [219 P.2d 814], namely,
the difference betweeu the face value of the certificates and
the amount paid. Ordinarily, the measure of damages for
fraud is that set forth in section 3343 of the Civil Code. But
there is an exception to that rule. Campbell v. Birch, suzJra
( 19 Cal.2d 778) sets forth that where the claims compromised
through fraud are not disputed as to their amount, or as to
their E'xistence, the one defrauded is entitled to their face
Yalue. In that case, due to fraudulent representations as to
his lack of financial responsibility, Birch induced Campbell
to compromise an indebtedness of $9,412.59 including over
$6,000 of judgments, and to agree to a reduction in the rental
payments of a five-year lease from $1,000 to $500 per month,
all for a payment of $6,000. Later, discovering the fraud,
Campbell sued in fraud and deceit to recover the indebtedness
including the face value of the judgments, and the accrued
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137 C.2d 430; 233 P.2d

rentaL The court
daim the defrauded
does not have to prove collectibiJ.
ity, distinguishing the facts of its case from Westerfeld v.
Ncu• York Life Ins. Go., 129 Cal. 68
P.
61 P. 667],
\Vhich held that where the compromised claim was a disputed
daim, there must be
of
Tl1e court then
to the
the
eause of action is one where the
frauded party is fixed and
as fixed and certain
as if the defrauded party had technically rescinded. Obviously, if no compromise had been made, plaintiff would haw:
been entitled to a judgment or judgments for the unpaid
rrnt. The judgment in the present case is exactly in the
amount the plaintiff would have been entitled to if no compromise induced by defendants' fraud, had been negotiated.
\Vhat other measure of damages would compensate the defrauded party under such circumstances? The only way the
defrauded party can be made whole is to return to him the
amount to which he admittedly would be entitled had the
fraudulent compromise not been secured. To urge that the
defrauded party must show that the undisputed liability was
in fact collectible in the sense that the defendants were finaneially responsible is to bring in a false issue. Courts in
rendering judgments are not interested in whether the plaintiff ran collert the same-they are concerned with the amount
of the damage suffered. The collectibility of the compromised
judgments and claims and the collectibility of the present
judgment, are matters which are entirely beyond the issues
in this case. \Vhen the plaintiff proved the claims were fixed,
cleflnite and admitted as to their existence and amount he
proved they were "collectible" as that term is used in such
eases.' (P. 793.)
"Defendants ron tend that on rescission all plaintiff ·would
br entitled to was a return of the eertificates. If this wer('
trnr, then in the Campbell case, all the plaintiff would have
brrn entitled to was the compromised claims rather than what
thr conrt held he was entitled to, their face value. Likewise,
on such a basis, plaintiff in the Bank of America ease woulfl
have been given baek his judgment only, and not damages in
its faee value. Here, the claim (the face value of the certifl.
cates), and its existence could not be disputed. True, the
question of whether it would be collectible was uncertain,
but so were the judgments in the Campbell case. Here, the
relation between the certiflcate holders and defendants was
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that of creditors and debtors. The amount of the debt was
the face value of the
and their
as said in
the Campbell case, is 'prima facie the difference between the
amount paid on the compromise and the face amount of the
fixed and certain claim.' (P. 793.)
"In Bank of America v. G1'eenbach, S1l]Jra
Cal.App.2d
220), we held that where a creditor had bern inducrd b,\'
fraud to settle a judgment for less than its full amount, the
creditor ·was entitled to restoration of the full judgment
the amount paid) rather than a judgment for the creditor's
pro rata share of the debtor's assrts at the time of the fraud.
'There is no authority cited, and no logical argument made,
that support the conclusion that a creditor, fraudulently in·
<lnced to enter into a settlrment of his claim upon material
misrepresentations as to assets, can or should be limited, il1 a
rescission action, to a judgment for the pro rata share of the
assets of the debtor as they existed on the date of settlement.
'rhe cancellation of an agreement of settlement necessaril~·
has the effect of placing the parties where they were before the
settlement was made. It is as if the settlement had neYer
been made. Authorities are legion and uniform to the effect
that the legal effect of a rescission is to restore both parties to
their former position as far as possible. ( 3 Pomeroy, Equity
,Jnr. (5th ed.) 578; 3 Black on Rescission and Cancellation,
p. 1660, § 700; 15 C .•T.S. p. 767, § 43.) Tl1e authorities also
agree that, concurrent with the award of rrscission, thr trial
eonrt may award money damages or order >~neb othrr relirf
as justice may require. (4 CaLTnr. p. 797, § 29.) In the prr,.:rnt ease the court canceled the settlement agreement. Tt
should then haye reinstated the original judgment. The
amount of that judgment is fixed and certain.' (P. 2R8.) To
hold otherwise in this case would put a premium on fraud.
"The mere fact that the debt of Pacific States to the certifit·<ttr holdrr as evidencf'd by the certifirate. was not immediately
due or payable, does not mah the amonnt of that drht any less
fixed, definite or admitted. There is nn logical di,;tinction
between the indebtedness in the Campbell ease and the judg·
ment in the Bank of America ease, and the certificates in thifl
ease. Here there were no disputed claims as there were in
Westerfeld v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra (129 Cal. 68).
On demurrer we must accept the allegations of the complaint
as true. It is alleged, among other things, that the Pacific
States fraudulently deprrssed the market so that it might in·
dn<'e holdrrs to srll their certificates. If the measure of darn-
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ilw diff(•n•nee lwtw\'('ll thP anww1t rPecivcd and the
ad.uul valw~ of the eertifieates
market
the defendauts wonld be in the position of saying, in
,.ffet·t, 'True. we franclulently induced you to sell your certifint res. hut, as we had sneeeeded in holding their value down
" liP a1nonnt \\'('
you, there is
you can do about
!1.
would be Jll'ofiting
their own fraud, and the
nHil'l
would lw standi11g
br, permitting them to
rt'i!Jl tht• hane~>L
'l'he same would be true as to the actual
y;Jlu,·, ;1;; distinguished from the market value.
"Thu;-;, tiH· uwaSIIl'l" of damages being· the difference bet 1\'<'t·tt tlH' f;wt· valne of the certificates and the amount paid,
alld the foJ·nwr beiug gnrater than the latter, plaintiff was
entitlt>d to retain the latter and therefore was not required to
oll'el' j o n·st ot·c.
·while the testimony and exhibits in Pacific
Slates Sa1·inus and Loan Company v. Evans, Commissioner,
r<'fened to in plaintiff's proof of elaim (this case on appeal is
entitled l'acific States Sat·. d': L Co. v. Hise, supra L25 Cal.2d
~.~~ j), indi~ate that the !'Ompany vvas insolvent at the time of
1IH' ;dleg!•d fraud and that the investment certificates were not
wortl1 tlwi1· fae!' va!tH', the tlituation is no different from that
i11 tlw B<lllk of .\.mHil'a case, supra, where the eonrt found
that if at the time of the fraud all the debtor's assets had
he<>lt liquidate!l, the $88,030.f:i6 judgment would have brought
ollly $2D)l00. Nevertheless, it was held that the measure of
damages wa;; the faee nllue of the judgment. In our ease,
whether· the (·ertificates ever would be worth their face value
11as problematical, depending on the manner in whieh the
•·ompany operated its affairs, and later, on the manner in
1rhid1 the building and loan commissioner operated them.
!Iowewr, if at that time, plaintiff proved the fraud, he would
lw (•Jititled to a judgment for their face value. Nor would
suelt jndgmeut have placed him in substantially a better posit iou than tile eertificate holders who kept their certificates.
II" would lm ve been a creditor on a par with them. These
<·prtifieate~ are 'a type of unsecured note or debenture' (In rc
Pncijic Coast Bfdg.-Loan .Assn., ];) Cal.2d 134, 141 [99 P.2d
~iii) ) , and lwm:(· tlH' relationship between the holder and the
''ompany is that of creditor and debtor. (See Bureau of Welfare, etc. Assn. v. Drapeau, 21 CaLApp.2d 138 [68 P.2d 998] .)
[f the eompany was actually insolvent, his attempt to collect
t ht" jwlgment would have forced the commissioner to take
tlw !'Ontpany over, and he would be paid only a pro rata of

C.2d
the
crt'tifieatf·
would have been one
,ljffel'enee b(•twP<'n the
holder and the certificate
holdrn;. His
wonld be due and payable immediIf the company ~were a going concern, the certificate
holders would have to file the necessary notices to enable
1hem to withdraw their
and wait the
period
for·
If the company were
this
would
mean
as the judgment could not be paid. If the
eompany \'\'ere not insolvent, there would be sufficient funds
1o pay both the judgment and the deposits, so that the short
period which the certificate holders >vould have to wait would
be only a minor distinction from the position of the judgment
ereditor. Practically speaking, the latter \vould have no
advantage over the former. The fact that there was a market
ntlue for the certificates at the time of the sale does not affect
the measure of damages. Particularly is this so where as
alleged here defendants had fraudulently depressed that value.
To hold that a building and loan company can by manipulation as charged depress the market, frighten the depositors, to
whom there must necessarily be owed the duty of not misrepresenting the status of their deposits, into disposing of their
(•ertificates at the depressed market value, where, had they
held on to them, they, like the others who did hold, would
have received their full face value, and then for the courts
to refuse to give relief because the holder had been paid that
market value, would be making a mockery of justice.
''As to one of the lists of assignors plaintiff alleges that the
assignments of their certificates were obtained after plaintiff
had given notice of rescission concerning all the other assignorR
and after said notices had been ignored and impliedly refused,
and that it would have been futile to give notice on behalf of
the later assignors. Under the circumstances of the case, the
giving of such notice would have been futile and therefore
unnecessary." (Cal.App.) 224 P.2d 733, 743.
];'rom the foregoing it is obvious that Counts 3 and 4 of the
amended complaint allege sufficient facts to state causes of
action based upon fraud and rescission and the majority opinion departs from settled principles of law in arriving at a
contrary conclusion. Considering the background of this
ease, the result reached by the majority is indeed unfortunate
since the records of this court disclose an orgy of fraudulent
eonduct on the part of the defendant unparalleled in the his-
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lory of California as a result of which thousands
inYestors were mulcted out of their life
·while
to these certificate holders has long been
it is a
and regrettable travesty that it should now be denied. I cannot stultify my conscience as well as my
of
in such a result.
I would therefore reverse the

Apprllant\
l% 1.

for
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HOY 0. WJLLfAMS et al., Hrspondcnts, v. FRANK D.
MARSHAU; et al., Appellants.
fl] Vendor and Purchaser-l'raud-Evidence.--In an action based
on sellers' fraudulent representations as to a ranch, evidf'ncP
sustains a finding that purchasers were without experience in
farming citrus groves and had no knowledge thereof or the
water supply in the valley in which the ranch lay, notwithstanding evidence that they had lived in an area with a similar
climate, and that one of them had resided on an apple orchard
and owned citrus properties in such Ya lley, where they testified
to being unfamiliar with water conditions and manageme.nt
of citrus groves in such va.lley, and that the.y did not manage
the other properties.
[2] Appeal-Harmless ami Reversible Error-l'ailure to Find on
Issues.-·-A judgment will not be reversed for failure to make
an express finding on an issue in the absence of material evidence to support the finding.
f3] Vendor and Purchaser-Contract-Quantity of Acreage.~ That
the exact number of acres of citrus trees on a ranch was matt>rial to a contract of sale thereof is shown by evidt>nce that a
seller represented the ranch to contain a specified number of
~~itrns acres, and that be dPtermined the price hy multiplying
the citrus acres by a price per acre.

McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 89(1); [2]
Appeal and Error, § 1706; [3] Vendor and Pnrchaser, ~ 23; [4]
Vendor and Purchaser, §61; [5] Usages and Customs, ~19; [6]
Vendor and Purchaser, § 240(3); [7] Equity, § 46; [8] Vendor
andPurchaser,§82; [9] Fraud. §.'52; [10] Waiver,~ 9; [11] Election of Remedies, § 5.

